What this evidence proves. And what it does not.
A verified bundle is worth exactly what it attests, and no more. This page states the boundary in plain terms so you can decide what to do with an artifact before you depend on it — not after.
Status: template for counsel, not executed legal text.
Binding contractual, DPA and SLA wording is finalised with counsel before any
signature. Nothing on this page is a warranty, legal advice, or a legal
conclusion. The canonical version of this document ships in the repository at
docs/RELIANCE.md; if the two ever disagree, that file governs.
What Swarrm attests
- Base technical integrity (E1). Named receipts, their key-log history, inclusion and consistency proofs and the checkpoint chain all recompute from the bundle. This is the maximum level an offline run can award.
- Live confirmation (E2), only when explicit. A receipt earns E2 only when a covering checkpoint is re-read from the public chain during that verification run and its RFC 3161 token chains to a TSA root you supplied out of band. Anchor or trust material carried inside the bundle is not sufficient — a carried anchor is a recorded claim, not a confirmation.
What Swarrm does not attest
- That a recorded statement is true. The log proves an actor signed it and that it has not been altered since — not that it describes reality.
- That coverage is complete. Capture is fail-open by design: a failure to record never blocks the customer's action. Gaps are rendered as gaps rather than hidden, but their absence from the log is not proof they did not happen.
- Legal admissibility, regulatory conformance, or any outcome of a dispute. Those are determinations other people make.
EU AI Act Article 12, in the Act's own vocabulary
Readiness mapping — not certification, not a legal conclusion.
Article 12 of Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 requires high-risk AI systems to allow for the automatic recording of events (logs) over the lifetime of the system. Against that wording, and only as far as the mechanism actually reaches:
- Automatic recording, over the lifetime. Consequential agent events are recorded as signed receipts as they occur, by the capture path rather than by an operator action.
- Traceability appropriate to the intended purpose. Each receipt binds the actor, action type, ordering position and declared context; sessions link related events, so one action can be followed from intent to outcome.
- Tamper-evidence. Records are append-only and bound into a checkpoint chain with inclusion and consistency proofs, so altering or removing an earlier record is detectable by recomputation from the artifact alone.
- Retention. Article 12 read with Article 19 requires at least six months, and 24 months for systems classified for biometric identification or law-enforcement use. Swarrm attests that what is retained is complete and tamper-evident against its checkpoint chain. It does not set, control or attest the retention period — that is a property of where the operator stores the log — and it does not classify the deploying system, so it cannot attest which duty applies. The compliance pack renders both facts explicitly rather than passing a control it is not entitled to pass.
Timing, from enacted law. The Annex III standalone high-risk obligations apply from 2 December 2027, as enacted by Regulation (EU) 2026/1744 (Official Journal 2026-07-24, in force 2026-07-27), which deferred the previous 2026-08-02 date. Material citing the earlier date, or calling the deferral proposed, is stale.
Check this instead of trusting it
Generate the compliance pack from your own instance and read the Article 12 rows. Every control is satisfied only by the receipts it names; an unmatched control renders as an honest gap. A control that renders SUPPORTED is telling you the receipts exist — not that a regulator has agreed.